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United States Capitol Police,
Washington, DC
The following is an edited summary of a
plenary session provided by the speakers during
the 25th Annual Conference of the Association
of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP)
Conference held August 2015.
The Early Days
We are going to talk a little bit about history.
We are sorry to bore you with this again but this
is going to be about the history of the Capitol
Police Threat Assessment Section. In 1987, the
command made a decision to develop a threat
assessment unit. We were trying to find out who
actually made that command decision but no-
body claimed it. We credit our Chief of Police
at the time who was James Carvino. The Con-
gress, the Senate, and the Capitol Police were
not satisfied with the results that they were
getting related to threats against Members of
Congress. At that time, the USCP was in the
process of starting a dignitary protection divi-
sion for congressional leadership and so they
needed a little bit of justification for spending
the money. Like everything else back then, they
did it in a really organized fashion as they
brought two investigators and a Sergeant to-
gether and said, “Ok guys, you are going to take
care of threats on Members of Congress.” We
will tell you that there was not a lot of training
on threat assessment and threat management
back then. But, as cops the only cases handled
then were direct threats like, “I am going to kill
you,” or “I am going to blow up your building.”
So we had a lot of stuff going on and our
caseload at that time, as you can see, was ap-
proximately 300–350 cases. However, Mem-
bers of Congress’ staffers were calling up and
saying something to the effect of “Tom Jones
just called and said I am going to do everything
in my power to make sure that the Congressman
is not in office next year.” At that time the
response would be, “That is not a violation of
the law. Call us if something happens.” Sadly
this was kind of the mentality in the late 1980s.
For example, if a battered woman came in and
said, “My boyfriend said he is going to kill me
if I leave,” police would respond we would have
to wait for a crime like a direct threat to occur.
We are not justifying the mentality back then,
but cops then mainly arrested and locked people
up. We were just starting threat assessment and
did not comprehend threat management. We did
not manage threatening people at that time. No-
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body ever thought about the threatening party
returning in the future. We made a lot of mis-
takes because there was not any threat assess-
ment training out there. There was no training to
interview the kind of people that we were going
to need to manage. When the TAS started, we
monitored the radios for a uniformed officer on
the Capitol grounds to say something to the
effect of “I have got this guy here who thinks
satellites are going into his head and he needs to
talk to Congress.” We would leave the office
immediately and started talking to the person of
concern. So for the first three years of the TAS’s
operation, the USCP viewed the “threat guys”
as making the mentally ill problem visitors go
away. But, we learned how to talk to visitors
who had delusional ideas, such as “You know,
the government was following me;” “I worked
for the CIA since I was three and they owe me
a lot of money.”
Another problem back then was gaining in-
formation quickly on individuals when appro-
priate. We have Lexus Nexus now, and the
private sector has Choice. People believe that
the government may have behaved like big
brother then but now the Internet exists and you
can find out many things about people that are
publicly accessible. We used to tell everybody
the first thing to is run a criminal check on a
subject of concern; now the first thing we do is
Google them as you find out a lot more. Threat
assessment professionals both love and hate the
Internet. The Internet propagates a lot of threat-
ening activity, but it is also a valuable source of
information. Getting information from NCIC
[National Crime Information Center] can some-
times be challenging as it can only be used for
criminal investigations.
Another early challenge was trying to get
stakeholders to report behaviors of concern at
early stages before problems escalated. About a
year after the TAS was formed, we went back to
command and proposed something novel at that
time. We were going to try and prevent the
persons of concern from getting to the point
where they were so frustrated or angry that they
want to kill or harm someone. One has to un-
derstand that with the government, units get
more money and more manpower with statis-
tics. So instead of going back at the end of the
year and asserting we locked up 150 guys and
sent 20 people to the mental hospital, we went
to command and asserted we are going try
something different and at the end of the year no
one will be killed or injured, but we still need
more money and resources. Believe it or not,
they told us you can do it for a year and then we
will evaluate it. Twenty-six years later we are
still evaluating and we are still learning. This
process has been ever-evolving and ever-
changing. It is one of the reasons we keep doing
this. You are constantly entertained when you
are in the threat assessment field—you cannot
make some of this stuff up. So we got out there
and we started educating, not only the stake-
holders and staff, but we also had to educate
other law enforcement agencies that we existed.
I mean there are times that we would have an
issue in a distant site like in Wyoming, for
example, and we would call local law enforce-
ment and say, “Congressman Joe has got a
threat, can you cover for me until I can get out
there?” The first response we would receive is
“Did you guys call the Secret Service?” We had
to remind colleagues across the country of les-
sons learned in 8th grade civic classes regarding
the separation of powers. The executive branch
protective agency has two main protectees and
we have 535. Our colleagues have learned about
our agency and we have been very fortunate to
receive substantial cooperation over the years
when we request assistance.
Concerning another thing that has changed,
how many of you remember fax machines? We
know there are probably not that many of those
around anymore but one of the best things about
fax machines was that it used a telephone line.
Back then there was no caller ID. It was also
really funny if you were trying to maintain early
evidence for prosecution as the fax machine
print would fade. We learned that the hard way.
Also in the past, we couldn’t trace a call from
the House side of the Capitol to the Senate side
of the Capitol let alone try to trace a call outside
of Washington, DC. You have to understand the
government works with the best equipment
available for the cheapest price.
Luckily, in 1991 we learned that there was
another unit in the United States that had threats
in their name—the LAPD Threat Assessment
Unit. We like they had threats in their name as
we did, we presumed they have got to know
something. So after contacts with the LAPD
unit commander John Lane, Zimmerman
learned of the local training related to California
issues and California law. It seemed like the DC
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Chapter of ATAP formed soon after that. If it
were not for the DC chapter, ATAP would not
be a national organization. ATAP realized there
was life outside of California so that is our
claim to fame in DC. We had both sides cov-
ered, the left coast and the right coast. We
cannot emphasize enough how much ATAP and
the people that you meet at ATAP have been
valuable colleagues and resources. The U.S.
Capitol Police is really unique as we do not
have field offices across the United States like
most Federal agencies do. We rely immensely
on local and state law enforcement agencies to
help us get though and understand what is going
on in their neck of the woods. So it was so
beneficial after returning from the second or
third ATAP conference and the bosses were
saying something like: “We have a case going
on in Cleveland and we don’t know anybody in
Cleveland.” Because of the contacts made at the
ATAP conference we gained connections that
allowed us to move quickly and cooperatively
with threat assessment activity. This is espe-
cially critical as the USCP not only has to assess
risks to the protectee quickly but also determine
the need to send protective resources in a timely
manner. Detective Zimmerman was able to sur-
prise his command with all of the national con-
nections he was able to develop through na-
tional ATAP meetings.
We described how the USCP Threat Assess-
ment Service started. Now, it is a much larger
operation. We went from two agents to the
current staffing of 16 agents. We have represen-
tation on the Electronic Crimes Task Force, the
FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit, and the FBI Vi-
olent Crime Task Force. So we have come a
really, really long way. We can remember when
we were all excited about 300 people coming to
ATAP national conference and you know we
are now pushing over 700 attendees. That is
awesome that more people are interested in
doing threat assessment. As exemplified by
ATAP conferences, we have to keep communi-
cating across disciplines if we wish to continue
to move forward. We will now describe some of
the trends the USCP encountered.
USCP Threat Assessment Data
The USCP has used Dr. Scalora since the late
1990s to provide case-based and research con-
sultation. The purpose of the research was to
evaluate trends in threat assessment activity en-
countered by the agency, verify relevant risk
factors as well as assess the outcome of threat
assessment and management activity. Our goal
is to share with you a little bit about history and
resulting lessons learned. It is also important to
not only understand how our knowledge of
threat assessment evolved but how those
changes of knowledge were spurred by critical
events—the USCP is certainly an example of
that. Analyzing case trends since the 1980s, you
see a spike in threat assessment activity follow-
ing the Weston shooting at the Capitol in 1998.
Our data points out that after a major public
incident, although many people will rally
around law enforcement and public institutions,
individuals who have a grievance against public
institutions will actually increase their activity
to bring attention to their grievances. Also note-
worthy is that after such spikes of threat assess-
ment activity, a new normal in caseloads
emerge to a new higher plateau. In addition to
inspiring others with grievances, these public
events will also get stakeholders to wise up and
increase their reporting of concerning behavior.
Several other events culminated in increased
threat activity within the United States Capitol
including: the Clinton impeachment hearings,
the 9/11 attacks, and the several Anthrax and
Ricin attacks toward Congress. A significant
number of cases also emerged during the first
(then Senator) Obama candidacy for President.
Substantial interagency threat assessment activ-
ity and collaboration occurred out of necessity
at that time. As the data suggested, increases in
threat activity triggered by these high impact
public events rarely came back to original threat
levels but often settled at new plateau levels.
Bottom line is that the agency had to be data
aware and data driven in its approach. We con-
stantly looked at the trends because we had to
be aware of when the trends might shift to
prevent encountering a “big hole in the safety
net” given evolution in threat activity.
Another noteworthy trend: Approximately
20% of the cases (and thankfully no more than
that) have involved some kind of problematic
physical approach toward the protectees or con-
gressional staff. We have been extremely fortu-
nate due to the effort of our agents and our
uniform personnel to keep that number at the
same level despite increased threat activity.
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Regarding additional trends, slightly over
four out of 10 people the USCP Threat Assess-
ment Section currently deal with suffer from
serious mental illness. Our definition of serious
mental illness is that the psychotic symptoms
displayed are observable and obvious to a
trained investigator. We are not referring to
subtle signs of mental illness or persons who
suffer from limited levels of emotional disorder
that is difficult to observe. We are tracking
blatant displays of psychotic symptoms.
We recognize the caveat that persons with
mental illness are no more dangerous than the
rest of the population. Our statistics show that
we have a lot more contact with seriously men-
tally ill persons of concern and most times it is
because they either stopped taking or refused to
take medications. We work with families who
have been ravaged by the impact of these ill-
nesses. Thankfully the number of cases where
such persons have been violent or intercepted
by law enforcement or other staff before some-
one was injured have decreased. We have to
take a very sympathetic and respectful approach
to them in many respects. One, because it helps
manage and move them along to find some
resolution and two, because they are coming
back. If we are rude or dismissive to them, they
are just coming back more angry. Law enforce-
ment had to shift its approach to dealing with
mentally ill individuals. Many of these individ-
uals may have frankly been traumatized early in
their lives. There are individuals that may have
very legitimate issues and sometimes frankly
the government has not treated them well. They
are not getting the benefits and things they de-
serve or maybe they have been dismissed and
patronized. In many respects, our agents were
the first people who actually listened to them
with respect or took them seriously while also
counseling them to avoid threatening activity.
Regarding other threat assessment trends, the
USCP has encountered more threatening com-
munications subsequent to 9/11. Bottom line,
people are just less polite and are more threat-
ening in communications toward politicians.
There is an increased level of coarseness in
communications toward political figures and in-
stitutions. We also realize that people are com-
municating more electronically and they are
hitting that send button a little more quickly
than they should or they believe that the com-
munication is anonymous. When Anthrax first
hit Capitol Hill, the hoax activity exploded to
thousands of cases, with several hitting Capitol
Hill almost daily. Though true positive inci-
dents are rare, the U.S. Capitol Police has
worked hard to maintain awareness of and at-
tention to screening procedures. In addition, we
spend a substantial amount of time evaluating
electronic communications and making sure
that our threat assessment approach is properly
accounting for this trend.
Another trend of concern relates to the Inter-
net. More problem communications contain ex-
tremist language and by extremist we mean
justifying violence to solve political issues. In
the past, if people wanted to read extreme doc-
trine they had to have it mailed and most people
had a hard time gaining access. Now they can
sit in the comfort of their own home or work-
place any time of day and find it rather easily
online. More persons are referencing extremist
language and it is difficult to determine if they
are “card carrying members” of the group or
just inspired by its language. We are also find-
ing more people contacting Congress who suf-
fer from serious mental illness citing extremist
language. The Internet is also providing sup-
porting networks for individuals who believe
they are “targeted individuals.” Such individu-
als have the belief (often delusionally) that the
government has picked them out, have them
under surveillance, and are making negative
things happen to their situation.
As we mentioned earlier, there have been
some significant impactful events that have
shaped how we have had to look at threat as-
sessment and management. In July of 1998,
Russell Weston left his family in Indiana to get
to the Ruby Satellite that was kept in the fourth
floor of the Capitol that we use to reincarnate
people and make clones. So it was a very tragic
day—in the aftermath two USCP officers were
killed: J.J. Chestnut and John Gibson. What
made it even worse was that after the shooting,
we put out feelers to all the staff to the places
that he lived and asked them to go through and
check if there was any previous communica-
tions with Weston. We are not playing Monday
morning quarterback. Three weeks after the
shooting, we got a box from the national ar-
chives from offices that had received commu-
nications from Russell. When you archive
something, whatever you give them is un-
changed including the little sticky note that was
271THREAT ASSESSMENT TRENDS
still on the letter. The sticky note that said
“What do we do with this guy?” was still on the
letter. Another note indicated that the commu-
nications should be reported to the police. It
should be noted that none of the communica-
tions contained any threatening language. But
we learned that the agencies needed to better
share information. The U.S. Secret Service
knew about Weston. The FBI knew about
Weston. Two state police agencies, at least,
knew about him. Numerous local organizations
knew about Weston. United States Capitol Po-
lice (USCP) was unaware of his behavior. The
USCP Threat Assessment Section had been
around 11 years and was training for all the
congressional offices regarding reporting. The
worst part about it was that stakeholders within
Capitol Hill did not report the concerning be-
havior when they could have.
Another thing we learned from the Weston
case is that you do not let bad cases drive bad
policy. We also learned to look very seriously at
what was it about the mental illness that might
put somebody at risk to eventually become vi-
olent toward one of our stakeholders. We
looked extensively at thousands of cases and we
found it was not the diagnosis of mental illness
per se that drove problem approach activity; it
was the nature of the specific symptoms that
increased risk. In Weston’s case, he suffered
from symptoms that suggested malevolent out-
side forces were causing him harm and causing
harm to things he cared about. As a result, he
was also displaying other risk factors that we
know about. Further, Weston dispersed his
grievance across other agencies, and displayed
the willingness to travel to express his grievance
with these agencies. As a result, these factors
suggested a high risk profile. When encounter-
ing this cluster of behavior that suggests high
risk, we move quickly. We get cases like this at
least once a month and many of them when they
have been engaged in some travel behavior or
moved themselves in closer proximity to our
protectees by the time we learn of the concern-
ing behavior. So if there is a silver lining to this
case, it forced us to learn about the clustering of
these high concern behaviors.
Another significant event of note—the Capi-
tol was among the first with the postal service
and some media outlets to receive anthrax and
ricin. Seven episodes of confirmed actual bio-
toxins were delivered to the U.S. Capitol or
nearby buildings. We should note that the
USCP was aware of bio-terrorism before this.
Staff were trained concerning bioterrorism risks
and to perform field testing. There were some
interesting things that we learned from the bio-
terror attacks. First was that such attacks were
quite possible. We know from the investigation
this likely was sent by someone who had access
to a highly weaponized and more dangerous
version because we didn’t expect it to actually
go through the weave of the envelope and cross
contaminate as well as it did. What were some
of the other lessons we learned? No matter how
well you train people, cops will rush to the aid
of other cops who are exposed to risk. It became
critical to make sure the boundaries of the hot
zone were rigidly enforced when biotoxins were
confirmed. We are not second guessing people
here. Nobody dealt with this before. As a result
of the act that the boundaries of the potentially
impacted area were not initially clear and the
information was not shared quickly enough,
many thought that they were being vicariously
exposed to Anthrax. We learned that the con-
tainment zone and management of it had to be
tighter—which happened better by episode two.
Also related to the biotoxin attacks was the
increased hoax activity that followed. The hoax
activity just went through the roof—impacting
vigilance of screening activity. As agencies
were inundated with thousands of hoaxes, secu-
rity procedures become lax and we had to learn
how to communicate about maintaining vigi-
lance. Peoples’ memories of the attacks get
shortened because of hoax activity.
In addition to the vigilance issue, which was
challenging enough, we learned that certain
events may drive activity and inspire people to
make more negative contacts that come in
waves or clusters. You then have to be prepped
for managing and screening waves of problem
activity. We then have to look for a pattern of
risk activity within the cluster just like we do
within an individual threat case. It becomes
critical that we make sure we do not let some-
thing slip by when managing these activities—
highlighting the need to be able to stand up a
rapid screening approach when these things
happen. Legitimate threatening activities may
become part of that wave and can be ignored
due to the number of cases to be reviewed.
Increased threatening electronic communica-
tions became another trend in threat activity the
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USCP observed. We presented here in prior
conferences our research related to predictive
factors related to electronic communications
and our data since have continued to reaffirm
these findings. We know from the communica-
tions literature that if people communicated
electronically they were more likely to be less
inhibited, more likely to be threatening, and
more likely to be obscene. We also found that
when people are communicating electronically
they are more likely to throw in more extreme
political rhetoric justifying political violence.
We found that such extremist rhetoric can come
from either domestic or transnational sources.
The person of concern himself may not be a
Jihadist, for example, but may use some of their
threat rhetoric. Although we can theoretically
say that the presence of extremist language per
se does not mean that a person is a Jihadist,
someone sitting in a congressional office some-
where and encountering such language is un-
derstandably going to be concerned. Now we
have to sort out whether there is a relationship
of this extremist language to approach activity.
By the way, victims tend to set a different
threshold for when they report electronic
threats, as they tend to be more tolerant of such
activity. If there is a direct threat, recipients are
more likely to report, but it is amazing how
much electronic threats will pass before they
cross the threshold to report—which impacted
our outreach activities substantially. Bottom
line, several studies have confirmed that the
modality of communication is not as important
as the pattern of the behavior. As a result, an
electronic threat in isolation is not as predictive
as the things we see in the rest of the threat
assessment literature related to patterns of con-
tact, motivation, and intensity of effort. If sub-
jects are threatening targets electronically and
they want to hurt somebody, they are also com-
municating in other ways. They are displaying
other patterns of behavior consistent with other
threat literature: personal motive, that intimacy
effect, and specific mental illness symptoms.
Other content of the messaging such as inten-
tion to approach and justified violence language
are also predictive. We have also encountered
increased communications instigating persons
to do violent or disruptive activity. Such activ-
ity, especially via tweets and retweets can take
on a life of its own. When evaluating such
activity we need to stay true to the threat as-
sessment model.
Speaking of being true to the threat assess-
ment model, we have continued to reevaluate
our findings though new data sampling to guard
against attrition in our effect sizes to make sure
that we are not missing certain factors or over-
playing certain factors. Bottom line, our find-
ings have been thankfully robust.
A constant challenge remains getting stake-
holders to report concerns to facilitate threat
assessment activity. We know that people are
not likely to report concerning activity to us
unless we ask them to do so. For example, we
have had to tell our stakeholders that if people
are instigating violent activity, please report.
Why do we have to encourage people to report?
Because they are exposed to many concerning
behaviors. We realize we are preaching to the
choir of the need for continued education and
reminding our stakeholders that it is not a bother
to report something. Often stakeholders wait for
direct threats before reporting. As we constantly
remind people that there is a pathway to vio-
lence and we can tie together trends of concern-
ing behavior to gain a better sense of risk posed
to prevent problem behavior.
We are seeing a lot more extremist language
and we have had to study whether it predicts
whether people are going to approach (and we
are still looking at it because we are not con-
vinced that the trend cannot shift). Right now
our data show that the presence of extremist
language by itself doesn’t predict anything mi-
nus other threat assessment factors. But we have
to monitor such extremist rhetoric. It means that
we work a lot more with our intelligence units
who are more familiar with such extremist lan-
guage. We also have to educate the intelligence
units when to report activity for threat assess-
ment for those same reasons. We have also
learned, given recent trends in the terrorism
literature, that more persons with serious mental
illness are being recruited though Internet-based
approaches. Persons do not have to physically
attend meetings to learn of extremist doctrine,
they can be inspired online. They can literally
obtain Al Qaeda’s Inspire magazine and learn
how to “make a bomb in the kitchen of your
mom.” We have found more persons who dis-
play symptoms of serious mental illness dis-
playing extremist rhetoric. It is concerning for
us because we already know that some of the
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delusional ideation being encouraged by ex-
tremist doctrine may facilitate movement on the
pathway to violence. It is sometimes easy to not
look past delusional content in communications
and note other antigovernment themes found in
extremist doctrine (e.g., currency being illegit-
imate, the government controlling that lan-
guage, issues against the new world order).
Another challenge facing threat assessment
professionals is ascertaining where our respon-
sibilities end when an individual is excluded
from a workplace, university, or other institu-
tion and is at large within the community. When
we are managing cases that are problematic and
of high concern, what are our responsibilities to
third parties when people leave our doors and
how do we share that information? For exam-
ple, some of our most concerning USCP cases
involved expelled college or university stu-
dents. We are not suggesting universities call us
for every disgruntled college student by far but
we have had cases of recently expelled college
students who were very disgruntled who had a
lot of extremist ideation. What do you do if you
are a university? What if you do not have a
specific threat? Who do you share that with?
These are open questions that things we need to
think about. Further, where do we go when
people do leak information relating to threats
(specific or otherwise) to third parties? We have
a suspicion that the courts may be defining some
of that for us in the near future.
As we touched on earlier, we need to con-
tinue to play nice together in the sandbox. We
are not operating silos anymore. We have
learned the need to share information and talk to
other people. We urge everyone here if you are
not a member of ATAP to seriously look at it
and see where your chapters are locally so that
you can go there. The profession will need to
continue to work on mechanisms for managing
and sharing information within and across insti-
tutions related to concerning behavior.
A final note from Dr. Scalora: As a friend and
colleague who witnessed much of Detective
Zimmerman’s service and contribution to the
field, it is bittersweet to recognize that he will
soon be retiring from the USCP. I want you to
join me in thanking him and recognizing his 32
years of service.
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